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Addresses Intelligence Symposium

STATINTL

CIA on Mend, Inman Says

By MATTHEW SPINA
Staff Writer

America's intelligence community, hampered for years by information leaks, budget cuts and an inability to attract new blood to its ranks, is on the mend, aided greatly by CIA Director William Casey and his close friendship with President Reagan, a once high-ranking CIA official said today in Naples.

Perhaps the most important tool in breaking through dense layers of bureaucracy is access to the president, said Adm. Bobby Inman, the CIA's deputy director from 1981 to 1982.

CASEY INFORMED President Reagan in 1981 of the dangerous problems afflicting U.S. intelligence agencies in terms of declining manpower and spending limits, Inman told an audience of about 400 people at the Naples Beach Club. He was the first speaker in the Second Annual National Intelligence Symposium co-sponsored by the Naples Daily News and Palmer Communications.

With Reagan's help and some sympathetic U.S. senators — such as Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and Sen. Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, the vice-chairman — the once sickly intelligence community seems on its way to long-term health.

Inman said the U.S. ability to learn of military movements by the Soviet Union is stronger than ever. However, he said, our knowledge of economic matters within the Soviet bloc is spotty and the ability to collect information on the political scene there is poor and always will be, because "we are dealing with a closed society, where decisions are made by a handful of people."

THE RETIRED U.S. Navy admiral said leaks of classified information comprise the biggest problem for today's intelligence gatherers.

The most damaging leaks in the past have come from senior administration officials, who, unaware of the importance of some information, passed it on at cocktail parties or similar social gatherings.

Others tell "their favorite newsmen some juicy tidbit in exchange for favorable news treatment later," Inman said. Such a leak can be particularly damaging if details on how the information is gathered tumble out.

Inman said the strength of U.S. intelligence agencies began to decline in 1964 when they began diverting manpower to collect strategic information for the Vietnam war. They sent agents who were needed to collect information in other parts of the world.

ALSO AT THAT time officials began to look at the Defense Department budget, he said. Top officials and budget planners learned that spying was perhaps one of the least cost-effective actions the department undertook and began cutting spending.

Steps to balance international payments of gold also hampered the intelligence community, Inman said, since diplomats were instructed to keep U.S. involvement in foreign countries low-key.

In the mid 1970s tales of abuses within the intelligence community, "some real, and a great many imagined," Inman said, began titillating audiences of evening news programs.

Such news resulted in an executive order describing how intelligence agencies should conduct themselves.

"Think of the poor operative in the field trying to observe a manual 130 pages long of thou-shait-nots," Inman said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 16

BOSTON GLOBE
27 FEBRUARY 1983

What does Washington know of POW mission?

By Ben Bradlee Jr.
Globe Staff

The sudden glare of publicity surrounding former Green Beret Lt. Col. James (Bo) Gritz' apparent incursions into Laos, in a privately backed search for American prisoners of war, has raised Watergate-style questions about what the government knew and when it knew it.

It has also rekindled debate on the underlying issue: whether US servicemen from the Vietnam war are still alive and being held against their will.

On the latter point, the Pentagon has declared dead all but two of the 2494 Americans unaccounted for. But families of the missing, various POW-MIA organizations, retired military men and others contend that the available evidence suggests significant numbers of Americans are still alive in Southeast Asia.

They point primarily to the 480 reports of first-hand sightings (many of them buttressed by lie-detector tests) of American prisoners in specific locations since the fall of Saigon in 1975. The Pentagon admits it "can't rule out the possibility there are Americans still over there."

But since the official repatriation of the POWs in 1973, getting a full accounting of the missing has not been high on Washington's agenda. Families and other POW activists accuse officials of foot-dragging and sweeping the problem under the rug in favor of a view that relations with the new communist order in the region must be forged.

Nonetheless, POW families and their allies are beginning to become a political force. On Jan. 28, while sources said Gritz, two other Americans and an escort team of Free Lao guerrillas were on their third foray inside Laos since November, President Ronald Reagan addressed the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia and said government intelligence was "fully focused" on the MIAs. Obtaining a full accounting of the missing, he said, had the "highest national priority" and he pledged to take "decisive action on any live sighting reports that can be confirmed."

Though the government officially condemns private forays as "unhelpful" to official efforts, it is evident that official Washington has had considerable contact with the 44-year-old Gritz (pronounced

Grights) since 1979, when he retired early from the Army to launch a series of POW intelligence-gathering missions or, now, rescue attempts. During that time, Gritz has sought to weave a subtle link between the Pentagon, the private sector and the shadowy world of his third, so-far fruitless POW project, but not for lack of official help.

Access to intelligence

Besides sighting reports, Gritz has access to top-secret US intelligence. Acting on this data — some of which has been examined by The Globe — Gritz convened a team of ex-Green Berets in Florida in February 1981 to train for a mission to Laos, but the project collapsed for lack of funds.

In November 1981, a Gritz team of four retired Green Berets dispatched two groups of Laotian resistance soldiers from Thailand into Laos on a reconnaissance mission. The Lao soldiers were made available to Gritz by Vang Pao, a former Lao major general who, at the height of US involvement in Southeast Asia, commanded some 40,000 anticomunist tribesmen as a secret army for the CIA. The Gritz-Vang Pao link was facilitated by then-California Rep. Robert Dornan, a conservative Republican from the Los Angeles area, who also arranged for Gritz to discuss his mission with Bobby Ray Inman, then deputy CIA director.

According to Malden private detective Vincent Arnone, an ex-Green Beret who participated in both the second and current Gritz operations, the reconnaissance teams returned to Thailand with no photo evidence of live POWs. But he claimed the forays did produce live sightings and locations of camps.

Reagan himself has been placed on the defensive by reports that actor Clint Eastwood, who contributed at least \$30,000 toward the current Gritz mission, informed the President of the operation in advance

and urged him to support it. White House and Pentagon officials say they tried to get word to Gritz through intermediaries that he should not proceed. Gritz associates contend, however, that the word from Washington was encouraging, not discouraging.

Whatever the extent of Gritz' support from Washington, and whatever the wisdom of his high press profile, supporters argue he is a formidable soldier who would not undertake a fool's errand.

A heralded Vietnam war hero cited as the model US soldier by retired Gen. William Westmoreland in his autobiography, Gritz holds a master's degree in communications from American University, speaks Swahili and Chinese, is a marathon runner and a karate black belt. He served as commander of the Special Forces battalion in Panama before assuming a post as chief of congressional relations for the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency, which oversees US military assistance programs overseas.

A copy of a 4000-word document made available to The Globe entitled "Intelligence Summary and Situation Report, Operation Gritz" — the blueprint for Gritz' current mission — helps shed some light on his foray and his reasons for undertaking it. The doc-

STATINTL

Inman: Soviets can't attack by surprise

By CHERYL COGGIN
Cox News Service

AUSTIN, Tex. — The United States shouldn't fear a surprise attack from the Soviet Union, according to the man once considered America's master spy. The rest of the world, he says, poses a greater threat.

U.S. intelligence can detect Soviet military activities, retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman said during a world peace conference Thursday at the University of Texas. Inman is former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"If you believe the most likely cause of an escalation to nuclear war is a direct strategic exchange with the Soviets, then you can, in fact, relax. That's the one event we're best prepared to detect the preparation of," said Inman, who joined a panel of military experts and political scientists at the conference titled Reducing the Risk of Inadvertent War.

"This country is more capable today than it has ever been in its history to detect and understand the implications of the massing of Soviet forces outside its borders," Inman said.

HOWEVER, THE United States has spent a decade reducing the size of its intelligence staff to help pay for satellites and other technology.

"We paid for them by giving up manpower, giving up people to sort out and make sense of what you collect," Inman said.

That reduction has crippled the intelligence system in such a manner that it will take five to seven years of rebuilding, he said, "before this country has a first-class intelligence system covering the surface of this world."

American intelligence is especially weak in the Third World, Inman said, where the Soviets could capitalize on unstable governments or crises.

THIRD WORLD crises pose the most danger to the United States, he said.

"That is where we stand more chances of a lot more unhappy surprises like Iran," said Inman after his address.

Before his appointment to the CIA, Inman was director of the National Security Agency, which handles the super-secret job of breaking other nations' codes and listening to radio and satellite communications. He was recently named president of Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp., a Minneapolis research and development company.

Another speaker at the conference, Lt. Gen. William Hillsman, said the country's security communications systems are only as good as the phone company. And the divestiture of American Telephone & Telegraph, he said, could have a profound effect on U.S. security communications.

The U.S. warning system begins with radar tied to the North American Aerospace Defense Command by telephone lines, said Hillsman, director of the Pentagon's Defense Communications Agency.

"Everything we do here in the United States . . . in terms of warning and deterrence, is provided to us by the common carrier, by the private sector, the AT&Ts, the GTEs (General Telephone)," said Hillsman, who is in charge of eight government satellites he controls "from the back room of my office five minutes from the Pentagon."

Former CIA Official Laments Loss Of Spies

AUSTIN, Texas

The United States weakened its ability to detect Soviet moves in the Third World when it reduced its spy force to pay for intelligence-gathering satellites, the former deputy director of the CIA said Thursday.

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, addressed a University of Texas conference here titled "Reducing the Risk of Inadvertent War."

"We paid for them (satellites) by giving up manpower, giving up people to sort out and make sense of what you collect," Inman said.

U.S. intelligence is especially weak in the Third World, where the Soviet Union could capitalize on unstable governments or crisis situations, Inman said.

Those Third World crises pose the most danger to this country, he said. "That is where we stand more chances of a lot more unhappy surprises like Iran," Inman said in remarks following his address.

Inman said the United States is well-equipped to detect major Soviet military movements, such as those that would be required if the Soviets planned a surprise attack on America.

"If you believe the most likely cause of an escalation to nuclear war is a direct strategic exchange with the Soviets, then you can, in fact, relax. That's the one event we're best prepared to detect the preparation of," said Inman, who sat on a panel of military and political scientists.

"This country is more capable today than it has ever been in its history to detect and understand the implications of the massing of Soviet forces outside its borders," Inman said.

In another address, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William Hillsman said the nation's security communications systems are only as good as the phone company. And the divestiture of American Telephone & Telegraph could effect the nation's security communications, he said.

"Our warning system begins with the radars out there looking, which are tied to ... the North America Air Defense Command by telephone lines," said Hillsman, director of the Pentagon's Defense Communications Agency.

"Everything we do here in the United States ... in terms of warning and deterrence is provided to us by the common carrier, by the private sector, the AT&Ts, the GTEs (General Telephone)," he said.

Hillsman said the changes in telecommunications could affect defense by delaying response time due to breakdowns if several companies are involved in one system.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

STATINTL

PROGRAM	Jack Anderson Confidential	STATION	WJLA TV Syndicated
DATE	February 19, 1983 7:30 PM	CITY	Washington, DC
SUBJECT	Boris Korzak		

JACK ANDERSON: This is the story of a CIA spy who's been on the run. He learned the hard way that the CIA has no fondness for secret agents who've outlived their usefulness.

The spy's name is Boris Korzak. He's a Pole who worked for the CIA in Denmark. He says the KGB, the Soviet secret police, discovered his identity and tried to kill him. Now Korzak fled to the United States two years ago. His reception here has been far from warm.

BORIS KORZAK: I feel that they betrayed not only me; they betrayed the whole idea of having an intelligence service. They betray the people who are your closest friends. And my God, you need friends, especially today, probably more today than ever before in your history.

ANDERSON: The CIA barely acknowledges his existence. In fact, the agency has refused to help Korzak resettle here. Korzak told my associate John Dillon that he's not the only one, that the CIA routinely tosses out its used spies like unwanted garbage.

KORZAK: I don't know, Johnny, if you're aware that the actual spying is not done by Americans or the CIA. It is only and exclusively foreigners. CIA only supplies with case officers and chiefs of station, people who are bureaucrats. It is us -- Czechs, Poles, Russians, whoever -- who do the actual spying. And there is a potential danger that people abandoned, dropped, thrown to the lions, as I said, and under enormous pressure that the Soviets usually use, they might start feeding the Soviets with the info, whatever they know, however significant or insig-

16 February 1983

PHOENIX
ELECTRONICS

STATINTL

Arizona will woo a group of 10 major American electronics firms which was formed in an effort to prevent Japan from dominating the electronics industry.

An informal task force appointed by Gov. Bruce Babbitt is preparing a presentation for Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp.

The consortium includes Control Data, National Cash Register, Motorola, Advanced Micro Devices, Digital Equipment, Harris, Honeywell, National Semiconductor, RCA and Sperry Univac. A spokesman said two dozen other firms are considering joining.

The consortium was formed this year after officials decided no single American company could compete with Japanese electronic firms, which receive low-interest loans, subsidies and other help from the government. The founders concluded a consortium could provide enough funding and research and development talent to compete with Japan.

Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, heads MCT.

A spokesman said the consortium is considering many sites for its headquarters and research facilities.

Larry Landry, director of the Arizona Office of Economic Planning and Development, said Tuesday that Arizona is on MCT's list.

"We will put together a first-class presentation of what Arizona has to offer," Landry said.



Former CIA official cites lack of manpower

By VONNE ROBERTSON
Staff Writer

The United States' ability to be prepared for economic, social or military actions around the world is seriously hampered by a lack of manpower.

So stated former Adm. Bobby Inman, who resigned as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in June 1982 to head a new \$50-million research corporation. Inman spoke at Claremont McKenna College Wednesday morning.

Inman served as director of Naval Intelligence from 1974-76, vice director of Defense Intelligence in 1976-77 and director of the National Security Agency from 1977 until his CIA appointment in February 1981.

He resigned from the Navy last July 1.

"I agreed to President Reagan's request to join the CIA for a short time and inaugurate some new programs," Inman said. "The president knew I would not stay. But I helped get my successor in place to continue the projects."

The former intelligence officer was charged by the administration with formulating plans to rebuild the national defense security system over the next seven years.

Inman said the CIA's strength has been seriously diminished in the past 20 years.

Inman's career in intelligence should assist him as chief executive officer of a unique firm called Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp., a research operation funded by Control Data, Digital Equipment, Honeywell, Sperry Corp. other computer companies.

The new corporation will concentrate on keeping ahead of Japanese technology in an attempt to protect the American computer market.

Japan has announced that it hopes to develop a new super computer by 1990 that works 10 times faster than the best models on the U.S. drawing boards.

Inman will direct research and development to help U.S. firms produce competitive goods.

"If successful, our firm will become a role model for other industries to protect U.S. markets, such as, in hindsight, we know that auto manufacturers should have done," Inman said during a press conference before he met with students.

During his public speech, Inman discussed the state of U.S. intelligence.

"There are a substantial number of agents from both friendly and unfriendly nations circulating in our country. It's so easy," Inman said.

"We were caught by surprise in Iran and other countries because of serious cutbacks in the CIA budget and the subsequent loss of manpower.

"While the administration felt we were getting information from Iran through liaison contacts, what we really needed were intelligent people who understood the language circulating in mosques and coffeehouses.

"One of our major shortfalls in Iran was the failure to know the degree of the shah's illness and how it affected his judgment," he added.

While U.S. intelligence information collection is falling behind, the Russians have advanced in the past 15 years, Inman noted.

The Russians circulate freely in Washington, D.C., collecting all types of information — formal and gossip, he told the students.

"At least the U.S. is better informed than before World War II," he added. "There will be no more Pearl Harbors but we need more lead time than possible under present information gathering.

"We have been caught short in Latin America by not having the personnel and information we needed," he stated.

Inman disagrees with some government officials who believe the use of satellites for intelligence gathering has precluded the need for agents in foreign nations.

"Using satellites for observation of weapon testing in Russia is fine if the tests are above ground. But for underground testing, on-site observation is vital. You must know about exact geography and other information even to calculate seismologic reports.

"One of my concerns is that we are trading technology for manpower. We need manpower to make sense of all the information which satellites can gather."

He said the Russian's KGB has intelligence agents inside the country as well as spread throughout the world.

One of the newest changes Inman sees in Russia under its present leadership is faster tactical response by the Soviets to U.S. statements. This week, they called a press conference within 48 hours to respond to a statement by Vice President George Bush. In the past, the response wouldn't have been made until two weeks later, he said.

In discussing espionage within England's intelligence agency, Inman said: "I don't know if the British have more spies or they are just better at catching them."

He feels that there are no spies in the top ranks of the CIA.

"My guess is that there are no spies in the top core of the CIA, but in the lower ranks, there are always people willing to sell secrets for cash," he reported.

According to Inman, leaks of "confidential" information have been a "way of life" in Washington, D.C.

"The media gets the information in three ways: A disgruntled employee — the over the transom bit — damaging but limited; those out to sell programs to damage someone else's program — often distorted information; and most damaging, top-level government information leaked by people who haven't the time to understand what's going on — so they gossip.

CONTINUED

"The best way to stop this would be to fire a few people, but that's hard to do," he added.

Iman said the U.S. information collecting system is the weakest in the third-world nations where the U.S. really needs to better understand the political and military goals to be prepared for future actions by those nations.

He predicts that it will take seven to 10 years to rebuild the CIA programs.

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STATINTL

Counterattack

A U.S. high-tech combine

Admiral Bobby Inman, who stepped down as deputy director of the CIA last June, is no stranger to high-stakes research in the face of a tough challenge from abroad. Last week he was named point man for the U.S. response to a formidable new Japanese industrial threat. As chief executive officer of a unique firm called Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. (MCC), Inman will head a research operation jointly funded by ten top American computer companies. At stake: the 42% U.S. share of the \$92 billion world computer market.

The idea for MCC was born when 15 big U.S. computer manufacturers met at a Florida country club a year ago at the invitation of Control Data's chairman, William Norris. Several months earlier, Japan's government and its computer industry had announced that they were joining forces in the Fifth-Generation Project. Its aim: to develop a new supercomputer by 1990 that works ten times faster than the best models on U.S. drawing boards and breaks new ground in simulating human intelligence. Reminding his competitors of Japan's rapid inroads into the semiconductor market, Norris convinced them that unless they began to



Bobby Inman

DIANA WALKER work together, American computers could go the way of compact cars and television sets. The first shareholders in the new cooperative, founded in August, include such industry heavyweights as Control Data, Digital Equipment, Honeywell, National Semiconductor and Sperry Corp. One notable nonparticipant: giant IBM, whose research facilities the new company may eventually rival. The U.S. Department of Justice has not challenged the joint venture, but plans to review every MCC research undertaking to ensure that antitrust laws are not violated.

With start-up funding of \$50 million, MCC will concentrate on four areas: advanced computer architecture, software technology, integrated-circuit packaging, and computer-aided design and manufacturing systems. MCC will not market products; that will be up to its individual member companies. One of Inman's toughest tasks, therefore, will be to maintain the delicate balance between cooperative research and the competing market aims of MCC's shareholders. Says he: "The ability of the partners to believe they are going to share equally and fairly is critical." But not quite as critical to this venture as their shared belief that working together is the way to beat Japan Inc. ■

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-1THE RESTON TIMES (VA)
3 February 1983

Ex-Agent Refutes CIA Claims

By Betty Reed

Reston Times Staff Writer

"I was a CIA agent for 25 years. I changed from a bright-eyed idealist to a total cynic, but it was a long trip." Ralph McGehee can say that now.

And he is saying it for all the world to hear. His account of those 25 years is told in his book, "Deadly Deceits." Just off the press this week, the book chronicles the events which led the young, eager man from the realm of belief to the hinterlands of Southeast Asia and the land of disenchantment.

McGehee, now graying and middle-aged, spent his entire career in the intelligence gathering branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. He does not look like a spy; he looks like the man next door. And that was to his advantage, he says. He suggests that we all take a good look at our neighbors—that pleasant gentleman on the next street may well be one of the country's top spooks.

Becoming an intelligence agent was not the career McGehee sought after graduating cum laude from Notre Dame University. What he had in mind was pro football. He had been a member of an undefeated team; three times national champions and he had been selected to play at the North-South All Star game in 1949. When he was picked up by the Green Bay Packers, McGehee thought he had it made.

But the quiet, somewhat bookish offensive tackle didn't make the grade. He was cut before the season started. It was too late to go back to his job as football coach at the University of Dayton and when the wire came offering him a position "with a government agency similar to the State Department" he wasted no time getting to Washington.

Officially, he was processed into the CIA which was then entering its fifth year, in January 1952. The Korean War, still in process, was in full swing.

"I don't know why they recruited me. They were looking for para-military officers, I guess, and people with a good academic record, too," he surmises.

The training, at Camp Peary near Williamsburg, prepared McGehee for a life of derring-do, clandestine operations and survival in the field. He says the training was wasted on him, always cautious, he rarely found himself in circumstances that were life-threatening.

In 14 years in the field, he claims the closest he ever got to anything indicated in most spy thrillers was on the island of Chinmen off the coast of China. There, in a hut with a tin roof, he says he could hear the bursts of shells fired every other day by the communist troops. Not that he was not always prepared for danger—he did arm himself when he thought it was necessary.

His main directive, however, was not one of violence. It was his job to gather information, to assimilate it and to pass his findings along to headquarters. This he did in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, although to this day the CIA will not admit to having operations in some of those locations.

Ask McGehee if he ever lived in Japan, for instance, and he will answer in the affirmative, but he declines to say where.

"I'm not permitted to say," is his reply.

Living in the schizophrenic world of the spy was not an easy one for McGehee. The family problems created by the need for secrecy were a burden.

"I told my wife I worked for the CIA, but I wouldn't tell her anything about it. She was not very happy," he says.

Finally, during one overseas tour, Norma McGehee decided to take a secretarial job with the agency. She was investigated and received secret clearance.

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STATINTL

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Too much intelligence

By William V. Kennedy

President Reagan and his national security adviser, William P. Clark, have thrown themselves a boomerang in their attempts to control news "leaks" and the flow of government information generally.

There have been a series of well-publicized fiascoes, the most recent of them an attempt to make the reporters who cover the Pentagon sign a secrecy pledge that would have made them an extension of the military propaganda apparatus. Earlier, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were humiliated by being subjected to a lie detector test, part of a search for supposed culprits who had released what now turns out to be accurate budgetary information.

Behind the smoke generated by those episodes and others is a valid issue — the management and protection of what are vaguely referred to as "intelligence sources." In fact, almost all such "sources" are technical means of collection lumped together in a category called "special intelligence," or "SI."

Access to this body of information is by grant of special "SI" clearances to people who have been cleared for access to "Top Secret." Because of the extra amount of investigation involved, such SI clearances are very expensive.

Congressional investigations in the 1970s and more recent statements by Adm. Bobby Inman and other intelligence "insiders" reveal a major problem with special intelligence. In short, there is too much of it. The largest problem is with the "signal intelligence" (also called "SI") produced by National Security Agency which Admiral Inman once headed. This huge organization puts out of the airwaves every day millions of telephone conversations, messages from passers, and a mass of routine commercial traffic. Much of this daily "take" is distributed under elaborate and enormously expensive security precautions to the thousands of people throughout the government who hold SI clearance.

Special rooms are necessary for storage of SI materials. These must be guarded 24 hours a day and "swept" periodically, and expensively, to protect against electronic "bugs." It was this extreme concern with SI security that produced what were, in effect, two separate commands aboard the USS Pueblo when it was captured by the North Koreans in 1968. That, in turn, led to failure to destroy much that might have been kept out of enemy hands.

Because NSA does very little analysis of what it passes on, the task of sifting through this huge mass of material is left to the recipients.

Now the truth of the matter is that most of what the people with SI clearance know is gained from the open press and radio and television broadcasts. For one thing, most of what comes in from NSA is outdated by the time it gets through the bureaucratic mill, irrelevant to begin with, or so turgidly written and poorly printed that it is almost impossible to read. But the SI clearance — with its telltale specially colored badge — has become such a status symbol throughout the government that unless you hold the badge and are seen to be rummaging through the SI "black books," you are just not with it in the eyes of your own colleagues and especially in the eyes of rival agencies.

Since most of the people who hold SI clearance are in high military and civilian grades, we are talking about a daily wastage of millions of dollars.

Generals and such are relieved of plowing through the "black books" by the employment of "black book officers" who sift through the daily files and whisper whatever nuggets are gleaned into the chief's ear. Since that doesn't keep the black book officers fully employed, they tend to tramp up and down staff corridors looking for "cleared" people to whom they can impart what they always

seem to feel will be earth-shaking news. At \$30,000 to \$40,000 per year, they are expensive messengers.

The inevitable product of this steady expansion of often useless material and of access to it is a growing carelessness. It was possible for years at the US Army War College, for instance, to gain access to SI briefings simply by taking an SI badge from jackets students left hanging in the post gymnasium during their noontime workout.

If Mr. Clark were truly concerned about protecting valid secrets and saving money at the same time, he would concern himself less with the press and more with this increasing problem of SI abuse and mismanagement.

So while Mr. Clark and his boss are barking and growling around the front door of the White House, the great swamp of expensive and largely useless information grows apace, suffocating in the process valid security concerns.

William V. Kennedy, a military journalist, is coauthor of "The Intelligence War," to be published in the spring. He has served as an intelligence officer in the Strategic Air Command and as a faculty member of the US Army War College.